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FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
by
Joseph W. McKnight *
I. STATUS
7NFORMAL Marriage. Although the resolution of most disputes con-
cerning the validity of an informal marriage occur in an inter vivos con-
ext, some of the more notable contests involving informal marriage1
deal with its post mortem consequences. The situation in Dukes v. Migura 2
concerned an inter vivos assertion of informal marriage and the subsequent
post mortem consequences. A woman alleging an informal marriage filed a
suit for divorce and sought division of the alleged community estate. The
man denied the existence of the union and thereupon entered into a ceremo-
nial marriage with another woman. The husband died in an accident and
the court joined his executor, but not his ceremonial wife, as a party in the
pending suit with respect to the claim to property accumulated during the
alleged informal marriage. Ultimately the parties entered into an agreed
judgment in the pending suit acknowledging the validity of the informal
marriage. The judgment resulted in a lien placed on realty devised to the
ceremonial wife under the husband's will.3 In a subsequent suit brought by
the wife of the informal marriage to foreclose the lien, the Texas Supreme
Court held that the agreed judgment was not void against the wife of the
ceremonial marriage. 4 The argument that the wife of the ceremonial mar-
riage was a putative wife failed to surface. 5 But even without the ceremonial
wife's knowledge of the alleged informal marriage, one could further ques-
tion whether the Texas putative-marriage doctrine would have produced
favorable results. Texas law tends to adhere to the antecedent Hispanic doc-
trine6 that a putative marriage contains only two significant incidents: treat-
ment of property acquired during the relationship as community property
* B.A., University of Texas; M.A., B.C.L., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. The author is most grateful to
Ronald D. Gray for his assistance in preparing this essay.
1. See Grigsby v. Rieb, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S.W. 1124 (1913), in which the institution was
authoritatively accepted in Texas.
2. 758 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, rev'd per curiam, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 410 (1989).
3. 758 S.W.2d at 832.
4. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 410-11.
5. Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Tex. 1975). Had the ceremonial wife known of
the dispute as to the husband's informal marriage, one would question her status as a putative
wife.
6. See J. ESCRICHE, DICCIONARMO RAZONADO DE LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA
1209 (2d ed. 1852).
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and treatment of children conceived or born during the relationship as
legitimate. 7
In Garduno v. Garduno,8 the court extensively explored the relationship
between the informal and putative marriage doctrines. The man and woman
began living together in 1980 and held themselves out as married until 1986
when the woman sued for divorce. When they began living together, the
man represented himself as single though he was then married. A year later
the woman learned of this fact, but the man assured her that he would get a
divorce. In 1984 the man told the woman that he was divorced. This was
untrue, but there was some evidence that the woman believed that the man
was then divorced. The man was not actually divorced until 1985. Thus, a
valid informal marriage could not have existed until the man was free to
marry. The woman, however, could have been a putative wife at any time
that there was an invalid informal marriage.9 At the first of the relationship
before the wife learned of the husband's existing marriage, there could have
been an attempted informal marriage but for the fact that the couple did not
agree to marry. Although the couple cohabited as husband and wife and
held themselves out as married, an agreement to be married could not be
inferred under section 1.91(b) of the Family Code' 0 if direct evidence defi-
nitely shows that there was no such agreement.I In 1984, however, when
the man told the woman that he was divorced, there was some evidence of a
present agreement to marry. If she then believed in good faith that the di-
vorce had occurred,' 2 a putative marriage could have begun at that time.
Because no claim was made to property acquired prior to the man's actual
divorce, however, the possibility of a putative marriage during that period
was irrelevant. The court's observation with respect to the character of
property acquired during a putative marriage is also irrelevant as well as
misleading. Although it is accurate to say that "property acquired during a
putative marriage is not community property, but jointly owned separate
property,"' 3 such property is nonetheless treated as community property for
purposes of division, just as separate marital acquisitions in noncommunity-
property states are treated as community property for purposes of division
under section 3.63(b) of the Family Code.' 4 As to property acquired by the
couple following the man's divorce from his first wife, however, the property
7. Davis, 521 S.W.2d at 603. Cf Fort Worth & Rio Grande Ry. v. Robertson, 103 Tex.
504, 131 S.W.2d 400 (1910) (putative spouse not treated as surviving spouse for purpose of
qualifying as administratrix).
8. 760 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
9. Id. at 738 (citing Rey v. Rey, 487 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972,
writ dism'd); Whaley v. Peat, 377 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon 1975).
11. 760 S.W.2d at 739 (citing Rush v. Travelers Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ); Perales v. Flores, 147 S.W.2d 974, 975-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1941, writ ref'd)).
12. Id. at 740.
13. 760 S.W.2d at 739 (citing Mathews v. Mathews, 292 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1956, no writ)).
14. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
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was community property because the existing attempted informal marriage
became a valid marriage by virtue of section 2.22 of the Family Code. 15
In Grigsby v. Grigsby 16 a majority of the court rejected the proposition
that a woman's refusal of a man's request that they be married ceremonially
constitutes disproof of an existing informal marriage. 17 Courts have previ-
ously rejected several variants of this argument'8 which is not borne out by
common experience.' 9 But even without a conclusive determination of the
existence of informal marriage, a prima facie showing of an alleged informal
marriage is sufficient to support temporary orders in a divorce proceeding. 20
In a criminal case2' the accused introduced evidence of an informal mar-
riage between himself and a witness against him in order to exclude evidence
offered by the prosecution. 22 The couple allegedly married informally while
living in Oklahoma. Hence, as the court pointed out, the standards of
Oklahoma law apply when determining the existence of the marriage.23 Pre-
viously courts sometimes overlooked this point in making a proper choice of
law to determine the validity of an informal marriage. 24
When Is a Divorce Granted? Over the last decade some important disputes
have turned on the point in time when a divorce is granted. If, for example,
the judge indicates from the bench that a divorce is granted, but one of the
parties dies a few days later, before a decree is entered, the other spouse may
then assert dissolution of the marriage by death rather than divorce. 25 The
spouse might then claim the succession rights that the death produced.26
Such disputes continue to arise. In Smith v. Stansbury27 the couple en-
15. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.22 (Vernon 1975).
16. Grigsby v. Grigsby, 757 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
17. Id.
18. See Rodriguez v. Avalos, 567 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ);
Warren v. Kyle, 565 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ). But a subse-
quent ceremonial marriage may tend to discredit the validity of a purported prior informal
marriage to another person. Estate of Claveria v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1981).
See also Roach v. Roach, 672 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ). But see
Rosetta v. Rosetta, 525 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ), discussed in Mc-
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 70
(1976).
19. It is not at all uncommon that couples solemnize informal relationships or renew
formal or informal vows from time to time.
20. Ex parte Threet, 160 Tex. 482, 485, 333 S.W.2d 361, 363-64 (1960); Garduno v.
Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Ex parte Ortega,
759 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
21. Richardson v. State, 744 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
22. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 504 (providing privilege between spouses for communications
during marriage).
23. 744 S.W.2d at 73.
24. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw.
L.J. 1, 1-2 (1987) (discussing conflict of laws); McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 106 (1977) (discussing Durr v. Newman, 537
S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
25. See Verret v. Verret, 570 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978,
no writ); Austin v. Austin, 553 S.W.2d 9,. 11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ dism'd);
Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex'. 1969).
26. See supra note 25.
27. 754 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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tered into an agreed property settlement stipulating that each spouse receive
all insurance policies in the name of that spouse. The judge approved the
agreement, made it an order of the court, and granted the divorce. A time
was set during the following week for the signing of the judgment. Four
days later the ex-husband died, and a month later the court signed the de-
cree. The ex-wife then sought a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals
to order the trial judge to strike language from the decree divesting her of an
interest in the life insurance policies on the husband's life in which she was
named as beneficiary. The court concluded that the error failed to qualify as
a "clerical" one that would lend itself to a nunc pro tunc correction. 28 The
judgment of divorce pronounced from the bench was final.
The trial of the suit for divorce in Milwee v. Milwee 29 proceeded similarly.
The couple announced agreement to a judgment, which was read into the
record. The judge then stated, "I will grant the divorce and I will render
judgment based on the agreements that I have read into the record." Before
the court presented the decree, the wife indicated her intention to withdraw
her consent to the agreement, as she can do at any time before judgment is
rendered, under section 3.631 of the Family Code. 30 The trial court, how-
ever, ruled that it had already rendered the judgment for divorce and the
appellate court agreed.3 1
Another line of authority deals with the situation when the trial court
reserves judgment on a matter that cannot be severed or is left unresolved.
The issues of divorce and property division are inseparable.3 2 Hence, if one
is granted, without the other, the judgment is not final as to either. In Pruett
v. Pruett 33 the Tyler court of appeals extended this rule to a child support
case, where the trial court had reserved the issue of fixing attorney's fees in
resolving a child support dispute.
28. Id. at 512. See also Smith v. Jones, 757 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988, no writ) (affirming summary judgment in favor of executrix of ex-husband's estate in suit
brought by ex-wife claiming life insurance proceeds). The court said its decision in the suit for
mandamus left the unappealed divorce decree as entered. Since that decree divested the ex-
wife of the insurance proceeds, summary judgment in her suit against the executrix was
proper. Id. at 437-38.
29. 757 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
30. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1989). See Seibert v. Seibert, 759
S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1988, no writ). In McCaskill v. McCaskill, 761 S.W.2d 470,
473 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ), the alleged revocation of consent was not
proved.
31. 757 S.W.2d at 431. See Prof. Sampson's comments on this and an unreported Hous-
ton case in STATE BAR OF TEXAS SECTION REPORT, FAMILY LAW 14-15 (Fall 1988).
32. See In re Johnson, 595 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ
dism'd); Garrison v. Garrison, 568 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ);
Garrison v. Texas Commerce Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garrison v. Mead, 553 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1977, no writ). For a discussion of the Garrison cases, see McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 122-23 (1979); McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 109, 122-23 (1978).
See also Exparte Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 123 S.W.2d 306, 313 (1939).
33. 754 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
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II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
Survivorship to Community Property. In Allard v. Frech34 the Texas
Supreme Court once again struck down a pre-1987 effort by spouses to cre-
ate a right of survivorship in their community property by mere agreement.
The couple attempted to convert community property into a joint tenancy, a
species of separate property, without an express partition of it.35 In spite of
the statutory authorization of such a conversion, 36 the court said that "the
language of [the statute] was not intended to abrogate" the constitutional
requirement 37 of a partition. 38
Although no appellate case has yet addressed the point, lawyers have
raised the question of whether the 1987 constitutional amendment 39 al-
lowing spouses to create a right of survivorship in their community property
by a written agreement applies to such agreements entered into prior to the
addition of the amendment to the Texas Constitution. In spite of the fact
that the editors of the West Publishing Co. note that the section was
"amended ... Nov. 3, 1987", 40 the Texas Constitution provides that legisla-
tion shall provide for the mechanics of amendment, 41 and the Election Code
provides that the election shall be canvassed within thirty days after the elec-
tion.42 Amendments favorably responded to by the people then become ef-
fective. 43 Hence the effective date of the amendment seems to be the day of
the election canvass, in this case, December 1, 1987."4 A recent Texas
Supreme Court case and a Texas Attorney General's opinion indicate that
the amendment does not affect transactions entered into prior to its adop-
tion, unless the amendment was meant to have that effect. 45 In Wesseley
Energy Corp. v. Jennings46 the Texas Supreme Court stated that "[t]he law
existing at the time a contract is made becomes a part of the contract and
34. 754 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1988).
35. Id. at 115.
36. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
37. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1876, amended 1987).
38. 754 S.W.2d at 115.
39. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1876, amended 1987).
40. Id.
41. TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (1876, amended 1987).
42. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 67.012 (Vernon Supp. 1989). The code provides that the State
Board of Canvassers whose membership includes the governor, the secretary of state, and a
citizen whom the governor appoints canvasses the votes on "statewide measures." Id. § 67.010
(Vernon 1986). The board must canvass the election results not earlier than fifteen days nor
later than thirty days following the election. Id. § 67.012 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
43. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. Nos. 0-6821 (1945), 0-6278 (1944).
44. 12 Tex. Reg. 4611-12 (1987). A proclamation of Governor Clements, dated Decem-
ber 3, 1987, reveals that the Board of Canvassers canvassed the general election results on
December 1, 1987. The canvass date, not the proclamation date, is the effective date of a
constitutional amendment. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-6821 (1945).
45. Wessely Energy Corp. v. Jennings, 736 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1987) and Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. JM-991 (1988).
46. 736 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1987) (citing Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 83, 76 S.W.2d
1025, 1026-27 (1934)). Wessely concerned the applicability of the old statute requiring the
husband's joinder in his wife's conveyances. The court held that the statute would have gov-




governs the transaction. '47 The Attorney General reiterates this point in his
opinion that an amendment does not affect a situation occurring prior to the
amendment's addition to the Texas Constitution.48
Marital Partition. The same observations apply to the 1980 and 1987
amendments to the same constitutional article as they affect premarital
agreements, premarital and marital partitions, and marital donations. In
1980 an amendment to the Texas Constitution allowed partitions and ex-
changes of after-acquired community earnings and income from a spouse's
separate property, so that the character of the property acquired would con-
stitute separate property rather than community property.49 In 198150 and
again in 1987, 51 the legislature enacted statutes implementing the constitu-
tional provisions. Following the constitutional mandate 52 these statutes 53
specifically provided that a marital partition requires an agreement in
writing.
The parties unsuccessfully asserted compliance with these provisions in
Collins v. Collins.54 Each spouse brought substantial separate property into
the marriage, and during marriage, pursuant to a mutual understanding,
each kept records characterizing the income from separate property as the
separate property of the owner of the property producing the income. The
parties reflected their characterization of the income in their joint federal
income tax returns which they both signed. After the husband's death, the
executor of the husband's estate asserted that these returns constituted writ-
ten marital partitions. Because the returns did not contain words of promise
or agreement, however, the court held that the recitations therein failed to
meet the standards prescribed for a written partition. 55 Although the only
statute mentioned by the court is section 5.54 of the Family Code, enacted in
1987, it appears that substantive provisions concerning content and form, in
force at the time the alleged agreement was made, govern each transaction.
Although the court fails to note the husband's date of death, it probably
occurred before September 1, 1987 when the 1987 enactment became effec-
tive. 56 The most one can say regarding the effect of the income tax returns
in Collins is that they constituted evidence of a written agreement between
47. 736 S.W.2d at 626.
48. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-991 (1988). The Texas Attorney General concluded that
TEX. CONST. art. VIII § ld(b) concerning the exemption from taxation of the homestead of a
surviving spouse was inapplicable to spouses widowed prior to the 1987 amendment of the
constitution.
49. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
50. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.41-5.46 (amended 1987). See McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 97, 102-104 (1982).
51. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.41-5.56 (Vernon Supp. 1989). See McKnight, Family
Law. Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 1, 16-17 (1988).
52. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
53. 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 782, § 1, 2964, 2965 (TEX. FAM. CODE § 5.45); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 5.54 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
54. 752 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ ref'd).
55. Id.
56. 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 678, §§ 2-3. It may be cogently argued, however, that
merely procedural provisions of the later enacted statutes govern the conduct of subsequent
[Vol. 43
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the spouses. 57 The tax returns fell short of constituting an overt partition in
writing.58
In Sadler v. Sadler,59 the effect of a 1982 written marital partition was in
issue. Prior to their marriage, the husband possessed extensive separate
property while the wife owned an insubstantial amount of property. The
agreement, drafted by the husband's attorney, provided that income from
separate property belongs to the owner of the property producing it. The
agreement included a warning in capital letters that a party to the agreement
might surrender claims to income from separate property. The husband's
attorney testified that, when the parties met to execute the agreement, she
spoke to the wife privately and urged her to retain a lawyer to advise her
concerning the agreement or she should, at the very least, study the agree-
ment carefully before executing it. The wife testified that no one privately
warned her about giving up valuable rights and that she did not understand
the terms of the agreement. The trial court refused to give the agreement
effect and divided the property covered by the agreement. The Houston
court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision concerning the agreement
and remanded the case for division of community property derived from the
husband's earnings which were not dealt with by the agreement. 60 The in-
termediate appellate court noted that the agreement was both brief and
clear, its terms were unfair, and no duress accompanied its execution.6 1 Fur-
ther, provisions of the Family Code, in effect at the time of the execution of
the agreement did not require that legal counsel advise a party to a partition:
"[I]f an accused in a criminal proceeding may waive his constitutional rights
to remain silent and to have counsel, we cannot see why a spouse may not
likewise speak for herself without a lawyer ... [T]he introduction of a fair
agreement, fairly executed, creates a presumption of enforceability. '62 In
commenting on the fairness of the agreement, the court noted that the agree-
ment did not preclude the existence of some community estate. 63 The Texas
Supreme Court, nevertheless, reversed on the ground that the lower appel-
late court had overlooked the fact that at the time of the trial and entry of
judgement, the 1981 statute on burden of proof was still in effect, and hence,
the proponent of the partition bore the burden of showing its validity.
Rebutting the Community Presumption. All property acquired by either
litigation involving earlier partitions. Such procedural provisions include matters of evidence
and burden of proof.
57. A memorandum in writing satisfies the requirements of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987) (statute of frauds).
58. 752 S.W.2d at 637.
59. 765 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, rev'd per curiam, 32 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 391 (1989). Validity of the 1984 pre-marital partition discussed in Dewey v.
Dewey, 745 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied), was not dis-
puted, however.
60. 765 S.W.2d at 806.
61. Id. at 808.
62. Id.
63. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 391, (citing ch. 782, § 1, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2964, 2965
(codified TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.45)).
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spouse during marriage is presumed to be community property.64 A spouse
who asserts that particular property is her or her separate property carries
the burden of proof in that regard. 65 Showing that the spouse acquired the
property with separate assets or on the sole credit of the spouse's separate
estate will suffice to discharge the burden of proof.66 In Glover v. Henry,
67
the husband asserted that the real property he purchased in 1947 constituted
his separate property. In making the purchase the buyer paid cash and gave
the sellers, his mother and his brothers and sisters, a promissory note. The
deed of conveyance to the husband "as his sole and separate property" fur-
ther recited that the husband provided the requisite cash from his separate
property. On payment of the note in 1957, the husband's mother gave him a
release stating that all payments on the note came from his separate prop-
erty. The appellate court stated that the deed recital, indicating that the
property was conveyed to the husband as his separate property, and the reci-
tal in the release, stating that the note was paid with the husband's separate
property, constituted "some evidence" to support the jury's finding that the
seller agreed to look to the buyer's separate estate for payment.68 After re-
viewing all the evidence, the court concluded that the seller indeed agreed to
look solely to the buyer's separate estate for payment.69 Though the court
did not describe the nature of this evidence, the assertion that the recitals
supplied some evidence of an agreement between the parties appears uncon-
vincing. Standing alone, the recitals evidence, at most, the grantors', partic-
ularly the buyer's mother's, intention to treat the property as the buyer's
separate property. Nevertheless, the court ultimately sustained the com-
plaint of the proponents for the community presumption. 70 The court con-
cluded that the trial court's instruction to the jury erroneously stated that an
ancient document 7' constitutes prima facie evidence of the recitals it con-
tains.72 Because the court determined that the instruction was improper and
unduly emphasized the importance of the recitals, it reversed and remanded
the judgment of the trial court.73
An aspect of marital property law that appellant courts have, in the past,
overlooked pertains to compensation for bodily injury paid over a period of
time extending beyond the termination of a marriage. In Hicks v. Hicks
74
64. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
65. McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973); Tarver v. Tarver, 394
S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. 1965). If that burden is discharged to the satisfaction of the trial court,
the proponent of community character of the property must demonstrate the trial court's er-
ror. There was some dispute as to characterization of marital property in Wahlenmaier v.
Wahlenmaier, 750 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988), writ deniedper curiam, 762 S.W.2d
575 (Tex. 1988), but the facts given are insufficient to provide a basis for discussion.
66. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d at 783.
67. 749 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, no writ).
68. Id. at 503-04.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 503.
71. An ancient document is defined as one in existence for over 20 years, coming from
proper custody, and not suspicious in appearance. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 901(b)(8).
72. 749 S.W.2d at 504.
73. Id. at 505.
74. 546 S.W.2d 71, 73-74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
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the Dallas court of appeals concluded that worker's compensation benefits
received after divorce constitute separate property, presupposing that all
payments are for loss of current income. 75 In Andre v. Andrle76 the court
considered a settlement for disabilities allegedly covered by an insurance pol-
icy. During marriage the husband had purchased a private policy of insur-
ance against disability unrelated to his employment. The husband used
community funds to pay the premiums. When the husband suffered a disa-
bility and the insurer refused payment, the husband filed suit on the con-
tract. The parties reached a settlement whereby the insurance company
agreed to compensate the husband with a lump-sum amount payable in
monthly increments. When the couple subsequently divorced, the husband
did not object to the court's treatment of payments received during marriage
as community property but he did object to the court's division of post-
divorce payments. In affirming the conclusion of the trial court, the East-
land court of appeals relied merely on the community character of the policy
of insurance to sustain the trial court's division. 77 Because it was entered
into during marriage, the contract and its fruits were indeed presumptively
community property. The burden was thus placed on the husband-insured
to show how much of the post-divorce payments arose for loss of post di-
vorce earning power. The husband evidently failed to discharge this burden.
In an agreed lump-sum award, compensation for loss of past and future
earning power is commingled, and it would therefore be very difficult for the
claimant of separate property to show its precise amount. If both spouses
had been joined in the litigation to claim the benefits of the insurance policy,
and the character of the insurance proceeds was agreed between them and
the insurance company, a judgment reflecting that agreement would bind all
parties concerned. 78
Perhaps the most difficult means of rebutting the community presump-
tion, but the easiest process to describe, is tracing: identification of separate
property commingled with community property.79 The spouse who at-
tempts to trace must do so with clear and convincing evidence.80 Though
tracing was attempted in Martin v. Martin,81 the effort failed. Prior to mar-
riage the husband owned two lots, one with a small building on it. During
marriage the husband and wife erected a larger building on one of the lots
and purchased a third lot. The couple subsequently sold all three lots with
their improvements for $700,000 ($200,000 in cash and a note for $500,000).
75. This view of the nature of worker's compensation conforms to that of the leading
national authority on the subject. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.10
(1981). But see J. MCKNIGHT & W. REPPY, TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 139
(1983).
76. 751 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, writ denied).
77. Id. at 956.
78. Such a device for adjudication is suggested in McKnight, Family Law. Husband and
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 71-72 (1974), and a similar contractual
arrangement may be negotiated.
79. 759 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
80. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
81. 759 S.W.2d at 464, 466-67.
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The sales contract failed to allocate specific amounts to any of the lots and
no records allocating the purchase price among the three lots existed. The
couple used the cash and monthly payments on the note for living expenses
and the payment of various obligations. Part of the note remained unpaid at
the husband's death, and his estate claimed it as separate property. The only
evidence offered on behalf of the claimant was the testimony of a real estate
appraiser as to the approximate value of the two lots when the husband died.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's rejection of the claimant's proof
as inadequate and unconvincing. 82
Retirement Benefits. Retirement benefits are ordinarily compensation de-
ferred until an employee retires. Thus, if one earns compensation during
marriage, the benefits are community property. 83 Hence, if the non-em-
ployee spouse dies first, his or her share of the employee-spouses's retirement
benefits are subject to the same rules of succession as other community prop-
erty. In Allard v. Frech 84 the husband nevertheless argued that benefits aris-
ing under a retirement plan maintained in compliance with a federal statute
belonged to the employee and not to the community estate. The conclusion
does not necessarily follow from the reason given. The husband further as-
serted that the 1978 decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Valdez v. Rami-
rez85 supports the federal preemption argument. Although in Valdez the
court relied alternatively retired on a federal law under which the retirement
benefits issue arose, neither the primary nor the alternative ground for the
decision rested on a rejection of community property concepts. 86 The court
there concluded that the employee's choice of retirement benefits under the
employee's retirement plan constituted a proper exercise of community man-
agement powers under state law. 87 The court further held, in the alterna-
tive, that the federal statute conferred management powers that prevail over
contrary state rules under the Supremacy Doctrine. 88 In Allard a majority
of the Texas Supreme Court rejected the federal preemption arguments. 89
In re 4oiner90 presented an intermediate appellate court with another sort
of argunient in favor of a separate interest in employee-benefits earned dur-
ing marriage. The husband's employer's profit-sharing plan required five
years of service before an employee became entitled to participate in the
82. Id. at 467.
83. Although a husband's employer maintained a pension plan prior to his marriage, the
benefits in the plan on the husband's behalf accrued during marriage and were therefore com-
munity property as deferred compensation. Dewey v. Dewey, 745 S.W.2d 514, 518-519 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
84. 754 S.W.2d 11, 113-14 (Tex. 1988).
85. 574 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. 1978).
86. Id. at 751-53.
87. Id. at 750-51.
88. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw.
L.J. 99, 115 (1979).
89. 754 S.W.2d at 114. The majority of the court, nevertheless, interpreted the Valdez
decision as resting "primarily" on the federal preemption argument. Id. The decision as re-
ported, however, does not easily lend itself to that interpretation.
90. 755 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
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plan. The company employed the husband over six years before his mar-
riage. The husband therefore argued that a court should consider his first
five years of employment as part of his time within the plan. The court
rejected this argument since the husband had not met the qualifications
granting him an interest in the plan until after five years of employment. 9'
Such a contention rests, in part, on the terms of the plan, and the court
rejected this argument because the husband had not then met the standard
to participate in the plan.9 2 Because the husband acquired a vested separate
interest in the plan after his sixth year and an eighty percent interest during
the first four years of marriage, the appellate court concluded that all subse-
quent benefits were acquired by that ratio of separate to community prop-
erty.93 Unless the employer's contribution and those of the employee
stopped at the end of the vesting period, however, this conclusion is errone-
ous. Such a vesting schedule does not characterize all benefits acquired
thereafter.
Texas courts generally treat all federal benefits payable from the Veterans
Administration as separate property and therefore do not subject them to
division on divorce on the ground that those benefits are subject to federal
law that does not allow division. 94 The United States Supreme Court re-
cently agreed to hear an appeal from an unpublished California decision 95
holding that the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act autho-
rizes the division of such benefits. 96
Interest in Business Entities
In Eikenhorst v. Eikenhorst97 the husband, a radiologist, formed two pro-
fessional partnerships with another radiologist during his marriage. At di-
vorce, commercial goodwill accounted for a $150,000 increase in the
partnership value. The husband did not offer evidence that this value re-
sulted from the personal attributes of the husband or his partner. The appel-
late court, therefore, held that the goodwill constituted a community
element in valuing the business entities, and consequently the trial court cor-
rectly refused to apply the rule in Nail v. Nail98 to this situation.99 But the
appellate court's affirmation of the divorce court's partition of the tangible
assets of the husband's solely owned corporate professional association,' °
91. Id. at 498.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 194-96 (Tex. 1981); Ex parte Johnson, 591
S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. 1979); Ex parte Pummill, 606 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980, no writ).
95. Mansell v. Forbes, 108 S. Ct. 2868, 101 L. Ed. 2d 904 (1988) (noting probable
jurisdiction).
96. 10 U.S.C. § 1408. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987), discussed in Solender, Fam-
ily Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 55, 59-60 (1988).
97. 746 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
98. Id. at 883 (citing 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1973)), discussed in McKnight, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27 (1973).
99. 746 S.W.2d at 888.
100. Id. at 887-89.
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without any apparent suggestion of an later ego situation, seems clearly con-
trary to principle. 'o' The husband did not offer evidence to show that the
shares of the corporation formed during marriage were not community
property, but the fact that the husband held all of the corporation's stock did
not make assets of the corporation subject to division as community prop-
erty.102 Besides, the appellate court also divided the community interest in
the shares of the professional association.103
The revelation of a community business interest often constitutes grounds
for disqualification of a spouse to serve as an appointed officer of a public
body or as a state-employee, because of conflict of interest concerns. Stat-
utes generally define rules of state-employment whereas traditional general
principles define rules for honorific appointees, such as members of gov-
erning boards of universities. The Texas Attorney General recently consid-
ered the situation of an officer of a state university who owned a .2 percent
non-voting community stock interest in a corporation doing business with a
university. 10 4 The officer's husband owned a more substantial separate prop-
erty interest in the corporation and the husband was employed by the corpo-
ration and paid a salary constituting community income. Although the
officer owned a very small stock interest, the attorney general concluded 0 5
that this direct financial interest and the indirect interest in the community
earnings of the husband constituted a common law conflict of interest bar-
ring the state from doing business with the corporation while the officer
served on the university's governing board. 106 The opinion distinguishing an
earlier opinion 0 7 that expressed the view that a state officer's community
interest in her husband's salary from a corporation doing business with the
state entity of which she was an officer failed to constitute a conflict of inter-
est under a statute defining a conflict of interest as "any substantial pecuni-
ary interest in a facility". 108
In another instance' 0 9 the attorney general was asked to determine
whether the husband of a bailbondsman could qualify to serve as a district
attorney's criminal investigator. The inquiry stemmed from a perceived cor-
relation between the number of arrests made and the consequent number of
bailbonds that a surety writes. The attorney general concluded that
although an investigator sometimes must decide whether probable cause ex-
ists in order to make an arrest without a warrant, such a decision did not
involve his wife's business in which the officer had a substantial interest" 0°
101. Id.
102. See Brooks v. Brooks, 612 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
103. 746 S.W.2d at 887. The court first approved the award to the wife of the cash from
the corporate bank account "for her community interest" and then went on to approve an-
other award of $150,000 for "the community's interest in the P.A. and partnership entities."
104. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-817 (1987).
105. Id. at 3878.
106. Id.
107. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-126 (1984).
108. Id. at 535 (discussing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4418h, § 2.02 (Vernon Supp.
1989), expired Sept. 1, 1985 pursuant to ch. 735, § 2.114, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 1848.
109. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-776 (1987).
110. Id. at 3658.
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within the conflict-of-interest statute. I I 
Reimbursement. The rules of reimbursement between marital estates come
into play when a claimant on dissolution of marriage pleads and proves a
contribution by one marital estate for the benefit of another marital estate. "1 2
The concept is a relatively simple one, but over the years courts have en-
grafted a number of refinements on the rule, complicating its application.
Although the Spanish law, from which the Texas rule is derived, was only
rarely used in an inter vivos marital dissolution context, 1 3 the application of
the rule on the death of a spouse was commonly used in reckoning accounts
between marital estates without recourse to factual equities." 4 Although
the Texas Supreme Court initially applied the fundamental Spanish rule in
cases of marital dissolution occasioned by death or divorce, adjudication of
the issue occurred infrequently." 15
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, concepts borrowed from the
Anglo-American law of partition and betterments were engrafted onto the
reimbursement doctrine, 16 and as the twentieth century progressed the con-
cept began to be referred to as an equitable one," 17 which allowed for reduc-
ing the amount of recovery as the equities of circumstances suggested.
During the 1950s and '60s trial courts tended to apply equity in a very gen-
eral way without recourse to proof of precise facts. More recently, however,
courts have required arithmetical calculation of amounts for reduction of
claimed reimbursement. As parties have tended to assert reimbursement
claims more frequently in divorce cases, courts of appeals have tended to
embellish their decisions with a welter of nice, but often confused, distinc-
tions. In Penick v. Penick 118 the Texas Supreme Court has undertaken to
sweep away some of the insubstantial distinctions and thus clarify the appli-
cation of the doctrine. Penick concerned significant payments of community
property made in order to discharge pre-marital purchase-money liens
against the husband's separate property. The husband, consequently, argued
that courts should reduce the reimbursement of the community estate by the
amount that the community estate benefited from federal income tax deduc-
tions attributable to depreciation of the husband's separate property. In ef-
111. TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE § 171.003(a)(1) (Vernon 1988) and ch. 323, § 1, 1987 Tex.
Gen. Laws.
112. A right of marital reimbursement does not arise after the termination of a marriage.
Thus, for the sake of clarity, the term "reimbursement" should not be used in that context.
See Seaman v. Seaman, 756 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1888, no writ); Tyler v.
Tyler, 742 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
113. The principal Spanish authority on the matter is A. AYERVE DE AYORA, TRACTATUS
de PARTITIONIBUS BONORUM COMMUNIUM INTRA MANTIUM et UXORUM et FiLUos ac HE-
REDES EORUM (1586). See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, Sw. L.J. 99, 139 (1979).
114. See J. McKnight & W. Reppy, supra note 75 at 177.
115. Furrh v. Winston, 66 Tex. 525, 1 S.W. 527 (1886); Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58, 66-67
(1858).
116. Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281 (1898); Clift v. Clift, 72 Tex. 144, 10
S.W. 338 (1888).
117. Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
118. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 143 (Dec. 14, 1988).
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fect, the husband asserted a counterclaim for reimbursement of his separate
estate for benefits rendered to the community. Relying on decisions of other
intermediate appellate courts, the Houston court of appeals concluded that
the husband could not setoff his claims against that of the community.1 19
The court strongly relied on Pruske v. Pruske 120 in which the Austin court
held that one should not set-off community revenues from particular sepa-
rate property against claimed reimbursement for community benefits ren-
dered to that property, because the community is absolutely entitled to those
revenues. 12 1 The court's reasoning in Pruske is sound, but it has no applica-
tion to a case of set-off of one reimbursement claim against another, 122 as
called for by the facts before the court in Penick.
In concluding that courts should set-off rights of reimbursement against
each other, the Texas Supreme Court pointed out that there is no substance
in the asserted distinction between reimbursement for capital improvements
of one marital estate at the expense of another and reimbursement of a mon-
etary debt paid by one marital estate for the benefit of another. 123 Indeed,
general rules for reimbursement should generally apply in all reimbursement
situations. Regrettably, in Anderson v. Gilliland,124 the Texas Supreme
Court laid down a rule that is not applicable to all situations, including the
situation discussed in Penick.125 Contrary to a long line of cases which fol-
lowed the established cost measure of reimbursement of Spanish law, the
court in Anderson applied a measure of subsequent value of the marital estate
benefited or depleted. One can easily apply such a test to improvements, but
not to the discharge of a lien since it is inapplicable by its very terms, as the
lower appellate court pointed out in Penick. 12 6 Although Anderson adopted
the subsequent value measure of reimbursement, in the interest of fairness,
the measure is essentially unfair to the owner of the benefited estate when the
property appreciates in value and unfair to the supplier of benefits when the
benefited property diminishes in value. 127 In the case of enhancement in
value, this measure creates unfair results because it is likely to give the
claimant for reimbursement a greater recovery than the spouse could, in all
likelihood, have negotiated by contract. 128 In the case when the benefited
property has lost value, the measure of reimbursement is unfair to the estate
119. Penick v. Penick, 750 S.W.2d 247, 249-50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988),
rev'd, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 143 (Dec. 14, 1988).
120. 601 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ dism'd).
121. 750 S.W.2d at 249.
122. See Beavers v. Beavers, 675 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ);
Schecter v. Schecter, 579 S.W.2d 502, 505-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ). For
another mention of set-off of reimbursement claims, see Rogers v. Rogers, 754 S.W.2d 236, 241
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
123. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 145.
124. 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1985).
125. 750 S.W.2d at 247.
126. Id. at 249. The same point is made in Martin v. Martin, 759 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
127. Id. at 247-49.
128. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw.
L.J. 1, 12 (1985).
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rendering the benefit when it risked expenditure without consent. The so-
called enhancement rule of Anderson, in reality, represents a subsequent-
value test, as the Texas Supreme Court in Anderson clearly holds. 129
Although the right of reimbursement remains non-recoverable until a mar-
riage terminates, the right actually arises upon receiving the benefit. One
should, therefore, fix the amount of reimbursement when the benefit is re-
ceived. Thus the value of the benefit, when rendered, not only represents the
most appropriate but also the easiest measure to apply because one only
needs to prove one value.130 Whether to establish some sort of equitably
adjustable rate of interest running from the time the right is fixed poses an
age-old question. Further, whether the property benefited increases or de-
creases in value after receiving the benefit is not necessarily related the re-
ceipt of the benefit.
In Penick the Texas Supreme Court very much stressed the doing of eq-
uity.131 No instance appears more out of harmony with the doing of equity
than the conclusion that a spouse may not assert a right of reimbursement
for the contribution of separate funds for family support. This result never-
theless resurfaced in Oliver v. Oliver.13 2 The court's conclusion rests on the
decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Norris v. Vaughan.1 33 The court
held that because of a spouse's duty to support his family and the availability
of his separate property for providing his family with necessaries, no right of
reimbursement for separate expenditures for support exists upon dissolution
of the marriage.1 34 One might advance the same argument against reim-
bursement for the satisfaction of any contractual obligation that a spouse
incurs. Therefore, due to the ill-conceived and unfair basis of the rule, logic
mandates casting aside the rule as an aberration.
In Dewey v. Dewey 135 the misconception that the assets of a separately
owned corporation are themselves separate property was the basis for the
husband's reimbursement claim. Such assets represent neither separate nor
community property; they belong to the corporation. 136 A professional cor-
poration employed the husband who, in turn, owned all of the stock of the
corporation as his separate property, and the corporation, as an independent
entity, provided a pension plan for the husband's benefit. Hence when the
corporation deposited its funds in the pension plan on behalf of the husband,
129. 684 S.W.2d at 675. The Texas Supreme Court in Anderson made it very clear that, "a
benefited estate is not required to pay more in reimbursement than the amount in which it was
benefited by the other estate. LIkewise, it is necessary to ascertain that the benefited estate pay
no less than it has been benefited." Id.
130. Measuring the right of reimbursement by increase or decrease in value of the benefited
property requires proof of two values: the value before the rendering of the benefit and that at
some later time. In Rogers v. Rogers, 754 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1988, no writ), the claimant failed in his asserted right of reimbursement, because he failed to
establish the value of the property upon rendering the benefit and the later values.
131. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 146.
132. 741 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
133. 152 Tex. 491, 502-03, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (1953).
134. 741 S.W.2d at 228.
135. 745 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
136. Id. at 517-19.
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no right of reimbursement arose in favor of the husband's separate property
for a benefit conferred on the community. The shares of the corporation
represent the husband's separate property, but one should not consider the
assets of the corporation separate property since they belong to the
corporation. 137
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Jointly Managed Community Property. Williams v. Jennings 138 involved a
misunderstanding between grantors and grantees of real estate and an inept
effort to rectify an error. A husband and wife, acting together, purchased a
tract of real property in 1972. At the time of the conveyance, a misunder-
standing arose as to the amount of the mineral interest the grantors owned.
The grantors apparently thought they owned all the minerals. The grantors
actually owned only half the minerals, and they conveyed that half to the
grantees. The husband-grantee was, however, dissatisfied with the way the
deed read. Without his wife's or the grantors' knowledge and without re-
execution of the deed, he procured from the grantors' agent a revision of the
language of one paragraph of the deed to grant all the minerals. Some time
later, the grantors, believing they had retained a mineral interest, conveyed
that interest to a third person. When the grantees of the first conveyance
divorced, the husband conveyed his interest to his wife. When the ex-wife
realized that the grantors' second conveyance of mineral interests conflicted
with the grant which she held, she sued for and recovered damages for slan-
der of title against the grantee of the second deed. On appeal, the defendant
argued that the former husband's efforts to reform the deed affected the wife.
On the basis of the trial record, the appellate court concluded that the prop-
erty conveyed to the husband and wife constituted their jointly managed
community property.139 As such, even if the husband acting alone had re-
ceived a reformation of the deed in valid form, under the circumstances it
could not have constituted a reformed deed. 14°
On the death of one of the spouses, different rules of management prevail.
In Shiffers v. Estate of Ward 141 when the husband died intestate in 1977, the
husband and wife were in possession of jointly managed community realty
subject to a purchase-money mortgage favoring the defendant. The follow-
ing year the mortgage was foreclosed for alleged non-payment. Not until
1981, however, did the widow apply for letters of administration which were
subsequently granted subject to her qualification by filing her bond and tak-
ing the oath. When she filed suit as administrator for wrongful foreclosure
in 1982, within four years of accrual of the cause of action, the widow still
failed to qualify in accordance with the order of the probate court. She did
137. Id. at 519.
138. 755 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
139. Id. at 881.
140. Id. The dissenting judge's contrary conclusion is based on pre-Family Code decisions
that no longer carry any authority in this regard. Id. at 887-88 (Sears, J., dissenting). See
Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. 1974).
141. 762 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
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not file her bond and oath until after the hearing in 1983. The defendant,
however, did not object until 1984 to the widow's ability to sue in her repre-
sentation capacity. In 1988 the court finally entered an award of damages in
favor of the administratrix. If the statute of limitations point is put aside,
the appellate court's handling of the issue of capacity still requires comment.
On appeal, the defendant urged the widow's entitlement to only one-half the
damages awarded because she sued in her representative capacity only and
not in her individual capacity. The court held that because she could have
qualified as a qualified community administrator under sections 161 and 162
of the Probate Code, 142 she could be regarded as having done so, and hence
she was entitled to recover on behalf of the entire former community es-
tate. 143 As a practical matter, the widow would have been even longer
delayed in procuring a surety as a community administrator than an ordi-
nary administratrix because of the large bond customarily required for a
community administrators. 144
There is an easier route toward sustaining the widow's management of the
entire former community through her capacity as an ordinary administra-
trix, provided that her ultimate qualification can relate back to the date of
tentative appointment, as the court suggests. The land had been acquired in
the names of both spouses. Hence, according to controlling authority 45,
during marriage the land was subject to the joint management of both
spouses. Section 177(b), of the Probate Code 146 deals with situations when a
community administrator has not qualified. Although a more careful draft-
ing of the first sentence of the subsection would include a reference to an
administrator as well as an executor, the third sentence suggests that section
177(b) is meant to cover situations in which either an executor or an admin-
istrator is acting as a personal representative. The third sentence clearly
refers to the power of a personal representative to control property subject to
142. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 161-162 (1980).
143. 762 S.W.2d at 757.
144. A large bond has been required to fit the breadth of the power of the community
administrator as defined in Brunson v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 122 Tex. 237, 56 S.W.2d 1073
(1933). But the scope of the community administrator's power was somewhat reduced in
1955. See Gray v. Gray, 424 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, wirt ref'd n.r.e.),
discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 56-57
(1970). See also In re Jackson, 613 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e per
curiam sub nom, Harrison v. Parker, 620 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1981), discussed in McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 97, 114-15 (1982).
145. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975); Cooper v. Texas Gulf In-
dustr., Inc. 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974). In Shiffers, 762 S.W.2d at 756, the court said that
"since the record does not reflect the source of the funds of the community claim on the
contract we must presume the funds to be joint management community property." Id. There
is no such presumption.
146. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 177(b) (1980):
When an executor of the estate of a deceased spouse has duly qualified, such
executor is authorized to administer, not only the separate property of the de-
ceased spouse, but also the community property which was by law under the
management of the deceased spouse during the continuance of the marriage and
all of the community property that was by law under the joint control of the
spouses during the marriage.
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the decedent's sole or joint management.14 7 Hence, as ordinary administra-
trix, the widow, if property qualified, had control over the entire community
interest in the property.
Liability of a Spouse for an Obligation Incurred by the Other Spouse. The
enactment of the 1987 amendment to section 5.61 of the Family Code 14 8
should help to dispel much of the confusion concerning the non-liability of
one spouse for an obligation the other spouse incurred during marriage when
the spouse incurring liability was not acting as the agent of his or her
spouse. 149 Rush v. Montgomery Ward 150 illustrates some of the confusion
the amendment is meant to obviate. The husband and wife opened an ac-
count with a store. Upon divorce, the court ordered the wife to discharge
the mutual debt. When she failed to do so, the store sued the ex-husband on
a sworn account and recovered a judgment against him. The ex-husband
appealed on the ground that the court ordered the ex-wife to pay the debt. 15'
In affirming the judgement of the trial court, the appellate court pointed out
that the debt was a community debt and the ex-husband was therefore liable
for it. 152 Under the proper analysis, however, the court should find the ex-
husband liable for the debt apart from all these arguments without any men-
tion of the phrase community debt. The husband was personally liable in
contract for the debt he had incurred.153
Tyler v. Tyler154 illustrates the consequences of voluntary payment of a
debt by a nonobligated ex-spouse. In Tyler, the ex-wife paid an unmatured
note which her ex-husband had contracted during their marriage. Commu-
nity stock of a divorced couple secured the debt. The divorce court provided
that the ex-spouses would divide the stock equally upon payment of the note.
The court further provided that after the dividends on the stock-collateral
reduced the note, the ex-husband was solely liable to pay the remaining bal-
ance of the note. The ex-wife's objective in paying the note consisted of
gaining control of half the shares of stock so that she might sell them. The
court concluded that when only one spouse remains liable for an obligation,
and following divorce the other ex-spouse pays the indebtedness without any
agreement with the liable former spouse, the payor acts as a volunteer and
cannot later recover from the benefited ex-spouse. 55 Having paid the note,
147. Id.:
The surviving spouse may by written instrument filed with the clerk waive any
right to exercise power as community survivor, and in such event the executor
or administrator of the deceased spouse shall be authorized to administer upon
the entire community estate (emphasis added).
148. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
149. When both spouses incur liability mutually, as apparently occurred in Rogers v. Rog-
ers, 754 S.W.2d 236, 241-42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ), this issue fails to
arise.
150. 757 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
151. Id. at 522.
152. Id. at 523.
153. Id.
154. Tyler v. Tyler, 742 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
155. Id. at 742-43.
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the ex-wife sued her ex-husband in the divorce court for her expenditure,
and the court awarded judgment to her as an aid to the enforcement of the
divorce decree. The appellate court reversed the court's award to the ex-
wife.' 56 Such a holding clearly exceeded the divorce court's power to en-
force its decree.' 57 The ex-wife had acted as a volunteer "with full knowl-
edge of all the facts and without fraud, deception, duress or coercion."
58
Homestead: Designation and Extent. In In re Montgomery 159 the court reit-
erated the proposition that "a person may not have more than one home-
stead." 60 Under the Bankruptcy Code16 1 the debtor claimed his rural home
of 1.7 acres as exempt property. 162 He also claimed as exempt three other
unrelated, apparently rural, tracts located some distance from the debtor's
home. The bankruptcy court denied the claimed exemptions beyond the
home.163 Similarly in In re Brown '64 the court held that exempt homestead
property excluded rural farm land rented to tenants which was not used as a
home.' 65 Another tract, not owned by the debtor but farmed by the debtor
for thirteen years until a year before bankruptcy, also failed to qualify as
exempt homestead property. When the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition
he neither owned nor used the property as a home, but rather the debtor
inherited the land within six months of filing. Therefore the property be-
came a part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.' 66 But when inherited, the
debtor used the land for purposes other than the debtor's home. Though the
court indicated that it would treat the property as exempt if the debtor used
it as a home at the time of acquisition,' 67 the debtor's evidence neither sup-
ported homestead use nor overt acts of preparing to make the land a home-
stead in the future.
168
An urban homestead may embrace two kinds of homestead use within the
one-acre limitation. The claimant may have a business homestead as well as
a residence, but not more than one of each at the same time. 169 In In re
Moore, 70 the homestead claimant sought to show that a business homestead
had been established on particular realty prior to its actual occupancy as a
156. Id. at 743.
157. Id. The trial court had apparently relied on TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.70-3.71
(Vernon Supp. 1989).
158. 742 S.W.2d at 743.
159. 80 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987).
160. Id. at 386.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1979 & Supp. 1988).
162. 80 Bankr. at 386.
163. Id. at 393.
164. 78 Bankr. 486 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
165. Id. at 487.
166. Id. at 487-88.
167. Id. (citing In re Sivley, 14 Bankr. 905, 910 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981)).
168. Id. at 487-88.
169. Archibald v. Jacobs, 69 Tex. 248, 6 S.W. 177 (1887) (residence and business home-
stead); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Ford, 417 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967), aff'd,
424 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. 1968) (business homestead). See also Johnston v. Martin, 81 Tex. 18, 16
S.W. 550 (1891) (a family, having established a homestead or a leasehold, could not establish
another by intent).
170. 93 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
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business and even prior to its acquisition so that the pre-acquisition liens to
which he had agreed would not attach to the property because they were not
executed in the manner that valid liens on homestead property are cre-
ated. 17 1 In all these respects the claimant was unsuccessful because he main-
tained another place of business and failed to consider the new property his
business homestead until he moved into it to do business.17 2 Implicitly the
court's opinion recognizes that once the move has been made from an ex-
isting homestead to an intended homestead, the homestead character of the
new place does not relate back to the time when the intent to move was
formulated.
Achieving exempt status of land through present acts that show an inten-
tion of future homestead use is one of the most difficult homestead concepts
to apply. In Farrington v. First National Bank of Bellville 173 the debtor
owned two pieces of property. In 1980 she acquired a seventeen acre tract
within the limits of an urban area but classified as rural property. After her
divorce in 1982, when she acquired full title to the property, the debtor er-
ected a metal storage building on the property and designated a home-site by
placing rocks at the corners of the area. She spent about three weeks living
there in her car and cooking on a campfire. In early 1983 the debtor bought
a two-bedroom urban home in the same urban area, and she was living in
that house when she executed a mortgage on the rural tract in September,
1984. In 1986 the bank foreclosed upon the mortgage. The mortgagee then
sought a summary judgment that the rural tract was not the debtor's home-
stead at the time it granted the mortgage. As proof that the debtor had
established a continuing homestead on the urban tract and had thus aban-
doned any claim established to the rural tract as a homestead, the mortgagee
offered evidence of various outward signs of the debtor's occupancy of the
urban home as her homestead, including the debtor's declaration of the ur-
ban lot as her homestead for ad valorem tax purposes in August, 1985. The
debtor, in turn, submitted an affidavit stating that she had continuously in-
tended to use and occupy the rural tract as her homestead. In reversing the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee, a majority of the
Houston court of appeals concluded that on the state of the evidence a fact
question existed regarding the debtor's homestead at the time the bank
granted the mortgage on the rural land. 174 The dissenting judge apparently
concluded that living in the urban premises constituted an abandonment of
any intention to establish a homestead on the rural land as a matter of
law.17 5 This point of view is akin to that which the Fifth Circuit Court of
171. If the property were a business homestead, it would have been necessary for the hus-
band and wife to execute all mechanic's lien contracts before work was commenced and for the
wife to join in renewals of liens. These formalities had not been complied with. 93 Bankr. at
481-82, 484.
172. 93 Bankr. at 483.
173. 753 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
174. Id. at 251.
175. Id. at 251-52 (Bass, J., dissenting).
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Appeals expressed in In re Claflin. 176
With the intention of defrauding his creditors, the debtor in In re
Moody 177 executed a gratuitous transfer of homestead property to a corpora-
tion which the debtor solely owned. The Fifth Circuit court held that no
real transfer occurred and hence the debtor did not lose the homestead ex-
emption under section 522(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 178 The court also
held that simulated fraudulent transfers of undivided interests in the home-
stead to third persons were void as a matter of law and the transferor there-
fore did not lose his homestead claim. 179 The effect of section 522(g), of the
Bankruptcy Code' 80 was not argued, however, and when read in conjunction
with section 522(b)(2),181 seems to support the opposite conclusion.182
In In re Peters183 a Texas bankrupt debtor without a Texas homestead
claimed a homestead in a foreign country as a Texas exemption under sec-
tion 5.22(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.' 8 4 The court held that the proper in-
terpretation of the Bankruptcy Code requires that the homestead be located
in the forum state.' 85 The court cited its own prior decision in support of
this conclusion.' 86 This interpretation seems to rest on the logical premise
that a debtor is adjudicated a bankrupt in the state of his domicile and hence
his homestead, if he has one, must be in that state. It may be suggested,
however, that if the domiciliary state allows an extra-territorial homestead
and the law of the state where the land is located also allows a non-domicili-
ary to assert a homestead there, a bankruptcy court should honor such a
claim. The meager Texas authority on the point 87 falls short of supporting
such a claim however.
In several instances bankruptcy courts considered the proper application
of the rule that a creditor must object to a homestead claim within thirty
days after the debtor asserts his claim.188 In filing his schedules, the debtor
in In re Cooke' 8 9 failed to claim particular property as exempt, but he an-
nounced his claim at the ensuing creditors' meeting, which the creditor at-
176. 761 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1985), discussed in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 1, 18-20 (1986).
177. 862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'g, 77 Bankr. 566 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
178. Id. at 1198-99 (citing 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(2) (1979).
179. Id. at 1199-2000.
180. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a), (b) (1979).
181. 11 U.S.C. § 5 22(g) (1979).
182. See McKnight, Prefiling Exemption Planning: A National Perspective in 2 REPRE-
SENTING DEBTORS IN BANKRUPTCY 3.03 at 3-12-3-13 (J. Norton, M. Rochelle & P.
Franklin, eds.) (1988).
183. 91 Bankr. 401 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 1988).
184. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1979 & Supp. 1989).
185. 91 Bankr. at 403-04.
186. Id. at 404 (citing In re Schmidt, No. 1-86-01102 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.-Sept. 1, 1987)
(not published)).
187. William Cameron & Co., Inc. v. Abbott, 258 S.W.562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1924, no writ). Cf Bell v. Indian Livestock Co., 11 S.W. 344 (Tex. 1889); Strawn Mercantile
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Strawn, 279 S.W. 473, 474-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1925, no
writ).
188. Bankruptcy Rule 3003(b), 11 U.S.C.A. 3003(b) (1984).
189. 84 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
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tended. More than thirty days after the creditors' meeting the debtor
amended his schedules to claim the exemption but the debtor failed to serve
the creditor with notice of those amendments. The creditor delayed more
than thirty days after the filing of the amended schedule to object to the
claimed exemption. The creditor argued that he made a timely objection
because he failed to receive notice of the amended schedules. Formal notice
of the amended schedules was irrelevant, however, because the creditor's
thirty days in which to object ran from receipt of actual notice at the credi-
tors' meeting. 190 On the other hand, when the issue is lien avoidance on
exempt property rather than the underlying claim of an exemption, the cred-
itor is not foreclosed from challenging the motion for lien avoidance though
he has made no timely objection to the claimed exemption. 191
Liens on Homestead Property. In Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville 192
the Supreme Court of Texas made it clear that a lien on homestead property
cannot be established by estoppel, though estoppel may prevent a homestead
claimant from denying the validity of an existing lien in some circumstances.
In this case the owners of the homestead promised to give a lien for improve-
ments on their property but failed to do so. The owners never made any
misrepresentations as to the validity of an existing lien. In order to fix a
valid mechanic's and materialman's lien on homestead property for im-
provements, the lien contract must be executed in writing before furnishing
materials and making improvements. 193 The homeowners represented to the
lender that they would acquire a mechanic's and materialman's lien before
commencement of the work. The lender agreed to finance the improve-
ments, but the homeowners failed to execute a lien.' 94 When the lenders
made the loan for the improvements, the lender prepared a lien contract,
backdated to a time prior to construction. The buyers executed this agree-
ment. The lender later attempted to enforce the purported lien, and the trial
court gave the lien effect on the ground that equity estopped the borrowers'
denying the lien's validity.' 9 5 In reversing the judgment, affirmed by the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court of Texas reaffirmed the strict construc-
tion of the constitutional requirement that a valid improvement-lien on a
homestead must be acquired prior to the beginning of construction. 196
190. Id. at 68.
191. In re Boyd, 93 Bankr. 538, 540 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); In re Montgomery, 80 Bankr.
385, 388, 393 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Mitchell, 80 Bankr. 372, 374-89 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1987). In Hardage v. Herring Nat'l Bank, 837 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1988), a debtor in
bankruptcy amended his schedule of exempt property to include an agricultural leasehold on
which there were unmatured crops. Four days prior to the amendment, however, the trustee
sold the unmatured crops. The court concluded that whatever claim the debtor might assert to
the crops as exempt was in the sales price rather than in the crops themselves. Id. at 1322-23.
192. 747 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1988).
193. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (Vernon Supp. 1989). See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 41.005, 53.059 (Vernon Supp. 1989); see also Bridwell, Texas Property Code Amendments,
52 TEX. B.J. 40 (1989).
194. 747 S.W.2d at 784.
195. Id. at 783-84.
196. Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville, 727 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
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In Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank,1 97 however, estoppel was relied on to
reject a homestead claim and thus to validate a lien put on the property. The
central issue in this dispute was whether the property mortgaged had been
abandoned as a homestead. At the time the lender granted the mortgage on
the property, the borrower informed the lender that the property was neither
his home nor his place of business. 198 At that time no one appeared to oc-
cupy the premises. Relying on the rule in Alexander v. Wilson, 199 the court
concluded that the apparent non-use of the property coupled with the bor-
rower's disclaimer of homestead estopped the borrower from denying the
truth of his statement. 2 ° °
In 1985 the legislature repealed Property Code section 41.005,201 enacted
as a non-substantive revision of article 3841202 in 1983, since it was out of
harmony with the revisions of chapter 41 of the Property Code. These pro-
visions relate to creditors who seek to seize the property of debtor-claim-
ants. 20 3 The draftsman of the 1985 act felt that declarations of homestead
claims, meant for the assurance of prospective mortgagees of non-homestead
property, are best handled by agreement. Lenders, however, achieved revi-
sion of some of these provisions in 1987. Article 41.005,204 as amended,
provided that a homestead claimant may voluntarily designate a part of an
urban or rural tract larger than the area which one might claim as his home-
stead. The purpose of this designation is to assure a lender, who seeks to
secure a loan to a claimant, that the portion of the tract not claimed as a
homestead will secure the loan. The lender usually initiates such a designa-
tion and immediately afterwards the lender grants the secured loan. At
some future time, however, the claimant may vary the homestead use of his
tract or may change his homestead entirely. To provide for that eventuality,
the legislature should amend the statute to provide guidance for creditors
who seek to seize particular land of a debtor.
Exempt Personalty. Prior to the 1983 recodification of the exemption law in
the new Property Code, 20 5 courts consistently construed the provision for
exempt "wearing apparel" to include jewelry. 20 6 A non-substantive revision
Dist.] 1987), rev'd, 747 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1988), commented on in McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 1, 33-34 (1988).
197. 758 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
198. Id. at 945.
199. 124 Tex. 392, 77 S.W.2d 873 (1935) (also an abandonment case) The court relied
particularly on Prince v. North State Bank of Amarillo, 484 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. 758 S.W.2d at 945-46. "[W]here the facts known to the mortgagee at the time, and
those of which he is required to take notice, are consistent with the declared intention of the
mortgagors, their declaration may estop them from asserting their homestead claim." 124
Tex. at 394, 77 S.W.2d at 874.
201. 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 576, § 6 at 3729.
202. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3841 (Vernon 1966) (repealed 1984).
203. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.005 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
204. Id.
205. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. (Vernon 1984), enacted as 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 576.
206. See In re Richards, 64 F. Supp. 923, 927 (S.D. Tex. 1946); Hickman v. Hickman, 228
S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1950), afftd, 149 Tex. 439, 444, 234 S.W.2d 410, 413-
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of the statute replaced the word "clothing" for the phrase "wearing ap-
parel." Overlooking the legislative history of the statute, the federal district
judge in In re Fernandez20 7 affirmed the holding of the bankruptcy court
that jewelry could not be claimed as exempt property.20 8 In reversing that
conclusion the Fifth Circuit 209 not only relied on the legislative history21 0 of
the act as passed without substantive change 211 but also on "the Texas tradi-
tion of liberality toward the debtor in construing exemption statutes. '212
The court nonetheless emphasized two limitations on the breadth of the stat-
utory language: (1) that the jewelry must be worn by the owner213 and
(2) that the jewelry is "reasonably necessary for the family or single
adult. ' 214 The bankruptcy court relied on both of these limitations in In re
Reed.215 The debtor, in this case, claimed as exempt property four rings,
two jeweled pins, and silver and gold coins. Though the debtor wore the
rings daily and wore the pins regularly but not daily, the debtor placed all of
these items in a safe deposit box to protect them from seizure by the debtor's
estranged husband. In the course of subsequent state court litigation, coun-
sel for the disputants agreed that all of this property should be kept in the
safe deposit box in lieu of the registry of the court, and thus constructively in
custodia legis. The court held that the rings and pins met the "necessary"
standard in the sense that they were "usual and appropriate for the reason-
able comfort and convenience of the debtor. '216 Further, because the state
court effectively held the property in its custody, the court held that the
property was secure from the writ of garnishment previously sought to reach
it. 2 17
Light cars or trucks not used for business purposes or two particular types
of vehicles, regardless of purpose of use are defined as exempt within the
value-limit for exempt personal property.218 Whether further business vehi-
cles may be claimed as tools of trade219 was before a bankruptcy court in In
re Weiss.220 In concluding that this further exemption was not allowed, the
14 (1950); First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake v. Robinson, 124 S.W. 177, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1909, no writ).
207. 89 Bankr. 601, 603 (W.D. Tex. 1988), rev'd, 855 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1988).
208. 89 Bankr. at 603. A bankruptcy court in the same district reached a contrary conclu-
sion by a somewhat different analysis in In re Peters, 91 Bankr. 401 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
209. 855 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
210. Id. at 219-21.
211. Id. at 221 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 1.001(a) (Vernon 1984)).
212. 855 F.2d at 221. See Olds & Palmer, Exempt Property in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN
TEXAS 23, 45-59 (1st ed. 1963) (J. McKnight, ed.). The Family Law Section Council of the
State Bar of Texas has suggested a general clarification of personal property exemption law in
1989; jewelry would be included in the list of exempt property and the "reasonably necessary"
test would be discarded for determining exemptions.
213. 855 F.2d at 222 (citing Hickman v. Hickman, 149 Tex. 439, 444, 234 S.W.2d 410,
413-14 (1950)).
214. 855 F.2d at 222 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(3) (Vernon 1984)).
215. 89 Bankr. 603 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
216. Id. at 607.
217. Id. at 607-608.
218. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(4) (Vernon 1984).
219. Id. § 42.002(3).
220. 92 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
[Vol. 43
FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
court relied on a case221 decided before the value-limit on personal property
exemptions exited and a bankruptcy case222 relying on that earlier case. In
commenting on the debtor's argument that the express reference to a boat as
a tool of trade suggests the inclusion of motor vehicles, the court responded
that the specific provisions enacted for motor vehicles precludes their inclu-
sion as tools of trade.223 As a matter of information the reference to a boat
was meant to replace the specific statute dealing with ferry boats.224 The
draftsmen of the 1973 statute, of which the 1983 statute is a recodification,
did not mean to exclude claims of additional vehicles as tools of trade as
indicated by the draftsman's commentary. 225
Without reference to the provisions of the Property Code, 226 exempting
the cash surrender value of certain life insurance policies from seizure, the
Insurance Code227 was amended in 1987 to exempt lump-sum proceeds of
life insurance. In In re Brothers228 the court rejected the argument that the
Insurance Code amendment meant to include the cash surrender value of all
life insurance policies.
The Texas Constitution exempts wages of an employee in the hands of the
employer, 229 and is reflected in the personal property exemption statute.230
Once the employee receives his wages, however, the exemption no longer
applies. 23' The fact that an agency of the federal government pays the wages
does not preclude a creditor's seizure unless the federal law so provides. 232
Although the Texas Constitution precludes an employee's creditors from
garnishing wages in the hands of the employer,233 and writs of execution and
attachment in Texas do not constitute a continuing levy to affect a wage-
earner's subsequently acquired property, interpretations of the provisions of
the 1979 turnover statute234 have allowed a court to require a wage-earner to
pay wages to a creditor as the wages are received in the future. 235 In Davis v.
221. McMillan v. Dean, 174 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
222. In re Trainer, 56 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
223. 92 Bankr. at 687.
224. See McKnight, Modernization of Texas Debtor-Exemption Statutes Short of Constitu-
tional Reform, 35 TEX. BAR J. 1137 (1972).
225. Id. at 1138.
226. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(7) (Vernon 1984).
227. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
228. 94 Bankr. 82 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
229. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28 (Vernon 1989).
230. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(8) (Vernon 1984). Neither the constitutional nor
the statutory provision exempts commissions of an independent contractor, however. This
point is illustrated by In re Perciavalle, 92 Bankr. 688 (W.D. Tex. 1988), dealing with the
nonexempt status of an insurance agent's renewal commissions. See also TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 63.004 (Vernon 1986).
231. Barlow v. Lane, 745 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, writ denied).
232. Cain v. Cain, 746 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex App.-El Paso 1988, writ denied).
233. TEX. CONST. art. XIV, § 28 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
234. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1987).
235. Cain, 746 S.W.2d at 862-63; Barlow, 745 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, writ




Rabon236 the Houston court of appeals termed this interpretation unconsti-
tutional, and the Supreme Court of Texas must resolve the impasse. In Bar-
low v. Lane,237 however, the Waco court of appeals termed a court's power
to make a turnover order discretionary. 23 8 The trial judge in his sound dis-
cretion may fashion an order to fit the particular case, taking into considera-
tion, for example, the debtor's necessitous circumstances. The court may
also refuse to grant the order. 239
In the course of its opinion in In re Fernandez,24° the Fifth Circuit men-
tioned the Texas exemption of "athletic and sporting equipment" 241 as an
instance of Texas's liberality toward debtors. Without adverting to analo-
gous state law, the bankruptcy court in In re Courtney242 construed the
"household goods" provision in the federal bankruptcy statute pertaining to
avoidance of non-purchase money liens on exempt property. 243 The court
held that household goods include such items as guns, bow and arrows, cam-
eras, a bicycle and a set of golf clubs.244
In 1983 the Fifth Circuit held in In re GofJ2 4 5 that the anti-alienation
provisions contained in the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) 246 did not exempt the corpus of a Texas spendthrift trust, set
up by a bankrupt debtor for himself, from the debtor's creditors. In In re
Brooks247 the Fifth Circuit held that creditors can no more seize a benefici-
ary's share of a trust set up by an association of which the beneficiary is a
member, just as if he was the sole settlor. 248
In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency 249 the United States Supreme
Court considered a Georgia garnishment statute providing that funds or
benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan or program sub-
ject to the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) are not subject to garnishment. 250 A creditor sought to reach va-
cation and holiday funds (welfare funds), of a beneficiary of a plan subject to
the act. The entire court concluded that the congressional act preempted the
field relating to the subject matter of the act. Because the federal act failed
to make such welfare benefit funds exempt, however, a majority of the court
held the Georgia garnishment writ could reach them.25' A minority of the
236. Davis v. Rabon, 754 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ
granted).
237. 745 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, writ denied).
238. Id. at 453-54.
239. Id. at 454 (turnover order limited to wages in excess of living expenses).
240. 855 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1988).
241. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(1), (3)(E) (Vernon 1984).
242. 89 Bankr. 15 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
243. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1979).
244. 89 Bankr. at 16.
245. 706 F.2d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1983).
246. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (Supp. 1988).
247. 844 F.2d 258, 263-64 (5th Cir. 1989).
248. Id.
249. 108 S. Ct. 2182, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1988).
250. GA. CODE ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982).
251. 108 S. Ct. at 2186; 100 L. Ed. 2d at 836.
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court would have precluded garnishment of the funds on the basis of con-
gressional preemption of the entire subject matter. 252 The effect of the 1987
amendment to the Texas personal property exemption statute is, therefore,
left in considerable doubt.253 The amendment exempts all benefits qualify-
ing under the provisions of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code, and benefits
under government and church plans as defined, and therefore excluded from
coverage, by ERISA. In the light of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court, the Texas statute may be beyond repair with respect to ER-
ISA benefits until the Congress acts to determine whether such benefits are
exempt. If the Congress allows the states to legislate the exemption of ER-
ISA benefits, the Texas Legislature can then clarify the language of the stat-
ute to make it clear whether benefits of a single plan or any plan are
exempt. 254 Without adverting to Mackey, the Fifth Circuit held in In re
Brooks255 that the Texas statute does not purport to affect claims and inter-
ests already fixed before the statute's effective date.2 56
The problems raised by Mackey provide an opportunity for rethinking the
present Texas personal property exemption scheme. Prior to 1973 there was
no monetary limit aggregate-value on the defined list of personal property
exemptions. The legislature adopted the view in 1987 that certain retirement
benefits that may greatly exceed that value are also exempt. A reevaluation
of general exemption policy is necessary in order to achieve a balance be-
tween the rights of creditors and those of debtors. Modest amounts of prop-
erty are excluded from exemption by the definitions of the Property Code
subject to a maximum exempt amount. Some thought should be given to the
comparative values of these exemptions.
IV. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
Jurisdiction. In Wahlenmaier v. Wahlenmaier 257 the issue was the court's
power to enter a decree of divorce on behalf of a petitioning wife who be-
came mentally incompetent prior to the trial. Although a court had not
adjudicated the wife incompetent, 258 she was unable to attend the trial or to
testify. The court appointed an attorney ad litem to protect the wife's inter-
est, and the court entered a decree in favor of the wife. 259 The respondent-
252. 108 S. Ct. at 2191; 100 L. Ed. 2d at 836.
253. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1988), commented on in Hall, Re-
tirement Benefits: Texas Property Code Amendment, 50 TEX. BAR J. 993 (1987). See also
Suhre, Clarification of Retirement Benefits as Exempt Property, 52 TEX. BAR J. 38 (1989).
254. This issue was raised in In re Komet, 94 Bankr. 82 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988). Putting
aside the construction of the act on that issue, the court concluded sua sponte that the Texas
act ran afoul of the preemption doctrine as defined in Mackey. That decision has, however,
been withdrawn for further argument.
255. 844 F.2d at 261. See also Steves & Sons, Inc. v. House of Doors, Inc., 749 S.W.2d 172
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
256. 844 F.2d at 261. Sept. 1, 1987. See 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 376, § 2 and § 3.
257. 750 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988), writ denied per curiam, 762 S.W.2d 575
(Tex. 1988).
258. Id. at 838.
259. Id. at 839. But see Garcia v. Daggett, 742 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, no writ). Supervening death of a party to a divorce, as opposed to intervening
1989]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
husband appealed relying on Hart v. Hart260 and Dillion v. Dillion.26 1 In
each case the court refused to entertain a suit for divorce brought on behalf
of an incompetent, though only in the former case had a court adjudicated
the petitioner incompetent. The reason given in both cases was the same:
the decision to sue for divorce is so personal that a guardian or next friend
on behalf of the incompetent cannot exercise it.262 In reaching the conclu-
sion that a next friend might pursue the incompetent wife's petition to judg-
ment, 2 6 3 the El Paso court of appeals relied on a 1983 enactment of the
Texas Mental Health Code protecting the constitutional rights of mentally
ill persons. 264 On writ of error, the Texas Supreme Court in Wahlenmaier v.
Wahlenmaier specifically disapproved the authority of both Hart and Dil-
lion.265 In the absence of contrary legislation, this conclusion and the statute
on which it is based lift the subject into the realm of due process. 266 Thus
rights that one may exercise on behalf of incompetent persons are greatly
enhanced. Although Wahlenmaier focused on allowing a next friend to take
a divorce to judgment on behalf of a petitioner who had subsequently be-
come incompetent, the tone of Texas Supreme Court suggests that a next
friend for an incompetent may petition for divorce on behalf of an incompe-
tent. If this reading of the opinion is correct, a guardian or next friend may
not only sue for divorce on behalf of an incompetent, but an agent serving
under non-terminable powers of attorney267 may presumably make a will for
an incompetent or change a will executed while the testator was competent.
In 1978 the Texas Supreme Court held that a party not participating in a
trial may successfully proceed by writ of error for a new trial if the prior
proceeding which the complaining party did not attend contains no rec-
ord. 2 6 8 The El Paso court of appeals in McLamore v. McLamore discussed
waiver of this right to a record. 269 The court held that one may waive the
right to a record in advance of the hearing provided the court consents to the
waiver and the fact that the court enters judgment may imply consent. 270
In another case27 1 an appellate court considered the point when a court
incompetence, has the effect of abating the suit. Id. at 809 (citing Whaley v. Brown, 649
S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. 1983); Garrison v. Texas Commerce Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
260. 705 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
261. 274 S.W. 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1925, no writ).
262. 705 S.W.2d at 333, 274 S.W. at 218-19.
263. 750 S.W.2d at 839.
264. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-80(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (Texas Mental
Health Code). The statute provides that "[e]very mentally ill person in this state shall have the
rights, benefits, responsibilities, and privileges guaranteed by the constitution and laws of the
United States and the constitution and laws of the State of Texas." Id.
265. 762 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1988).
266. Id.
267. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Vernon 1980).
268. Rogers v. Rogers, 561 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1978).
269. 750 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).
270. Id. at 807. For a somewhat related case see Barnett v. Barnett, 750 S.W.2d 881 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
271. Mortgage Funding Corp. v. Schuble, 737 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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loses its power to control a case. Once the divorce court enters its judgment
and thirty days have passed after the perfection of an appeal, the statutory
grant of power to make further orders ends.272 Thus, a court may properly
issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from restraining foreclo-
sure of a mortgage against a party to the proceeding. 2 73 Similarly, once
thirty days expire after the entering of an order severing the trial of third-
party claims from the suit for divorce, the divorce court can no longer allow
intervention of third parties. 27
4
Receivership. Section 3.58(h)(3) of the Family Code275 authorizes the ap-
pointment of a receiver for the protection of the parties' property pendente
lite. The Dallas Court of Appeals construed the reference to parties in this
context as referring only to the husband and wife and not to an intervening
creditor.276 Hence, if a court appoints a receiver of property at the insis-
tence of a intervenor, on joint motion of the husband and wife the court
should terminate the appointment. 277 Any subsequent judicial order ap-
proving acts of the receiver, such as sale of the property, is void. 278 The
power to appoint a receiver is an extraordinary one, and courts strictly con-
strue the statue authorizing such an appointment. 279
In Young v. Young 280 a settlement agreement left a large quantity of
household furnishings undivided and further provided that a court should
appoint a receiver if the parties could not agree on division. The divorce
decree incorporated the agreement. After two years, the ex-husband moved
for the enforcement of the decree and appointment of a receiver. The court
appointed a receiver and the ex-wife appealed. The appellate court con-
cluded that it possessed the power to appoint a receiver in order to facilitate
division of the property. 28' The court also determined that it has the discre-
tion to dispense with the requirement for a bond for the receiver. 28 2 Fur-
ther, such a receiver might receive compensation on a monthly basis rather
than in a lump sum. 28 3 Although the appointment of the receiver was
prompted by the agreement, because the agreement was silent as to the bond
and payment to the receiver, it may be inferred that the parties left those
matters to the discretion of the court.284
272. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(h) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
273. 737 S.W.2d at 340.
274. Mallou v. Payne & Vendig, 750 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ
denied).
275. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(h)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
276. Mallou v. Payne & Vendig, 750 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
277. Id. at 255.
278. Id. at 255-257, 258.
279. Id. at 254-55.
280. 765 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
281. Id. at 444.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.90-3.93 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
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Property Settlement Agreements. In Allen v. Allen 285 an ex-wife sued to en-
force the terms of a divorce-property-settlement-agreement providing that
each spouse continues to own one-half of all their mineral interests. When
the couple entered into the agreement, they owned a mineral interest which
the husband had increased pursuant to an agreement with a third person
prior to the divorce. Hence, the property-settlement-agreement and the
award in the divorce decree gave the wife a one-half interest in the entire
mineral interest. The appellate court, therefore, denied the ex-wife a con-
structive trust on that interest as superfluous and inappropriate. 286 The ex-
wife held a property interest in the minerals under the decree of the divorce
court. The appellate court distinguished cases 287 in which a court imposed a
constructive trust on personal property that a third person held as a result of
a spouse's gratuitous transfer of community property in frau]d of the other
spouse's rights.288
A somewhat similar case289 involved a divorce-property-settlement-agree-
ment in which the husband agreed to give his wife title to a term life-insur-
ance policy that his employer provided as part of his compensation. The ex-
husband's employer "owned" the policy when the parties entered into the
settlement agreement and at the date of the ex-husband's death. The appel-
late court, nevertheless, affirmed the award of all of the proceeds to the ex-
wife under the agreement in spite of the fact that the ex-husband had pur-
ported to change the beneficiary to his subsequent wife, and after the divorce
the benefits provided by the policy had increased due to the employee's con-
tinuing service to his employer. 290 The court carefully distinguished 291 this
case, in which the parties to the settlement-agreement vested all rights in an
existing asset in one of them, from other cases in which a divorce court292 or
the parties293 merely purported to divide property interests as they existed at
the date of divorce. In this case, Seaman v. Seaman,2 94 the second commu-
nity claimed against the estate of the deceased husband on account of any
benefit the second community may have conferred on the husband in the
discharge of his obligation to his ex-wife under the property-settlement-
agreement. Under the circumstances one would find it difficult to value such
a benefit.
When the spouses in MacMillan v. MacMillan295 divorced in 1983, the
husband participated in a military retirement plan, under which he elected
to provide a monthly income of $300 to his widow at the cost of $8 a month.
285. 751 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
286. Id. at 578.
287. Spruill v. Spruill, 624 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1981, writ dism'd); Carnes v.
Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
288. 751 S.W.2d at 578.
289. Seaman v. Seaman, 756 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
290. Id. at 58-59.
291. Id. at 59.
292. Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983); Crumley v. Crumley, 753 S.W.2d 417,
418 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
293. Hudspeth v. Stoker, 644 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd).
294. 756 S.W.2d at 56.
295. 751 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
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The agreed divorce decree required the ex-husband to maintain this benefit
but the ex-wife soon learned that federal law prohibited such benefits for an
ex-spouse. The opinion fails to indicate, however, whether there was a mu-
tual mistake between the parties with respect to existing federal law.
Although the federal law at the time allowed a voluntary form of insurance
for an ex-spouse at a cost of $360 a month with a resulting benefit to the ex-
spouse of $1,800 a month, the ex-husband refused to accede to his ex-wife's
request that he procure these benefits for her. After the amendment of the
federal law in 1984 to allow a former spouse to apply directly for such insur-
ance, the ex-wife applied to the U.S. Army for the benefit. In due time the
U.S. Army approved the application and deducted the cost from the ex-
husband's retirement pay on a retroactive basis to the date of divorce. Sev-
eral months later, in 1985, the federal law once again changed providing that
an ex-spouse could qualify for the same benefits, at the same cost, as a cur-
rent spouse. After the ex-husband refused to apply for this less costly insur-
ance coverage, the ex-wife filed a motion for clarification of the decree. The
court held that the ex-husband should provide the benefits immediately prior
to divorce but nothing more. 29 6 When the ex-wife appealed, the appellate
court held that one should construe the couple's agreed judgment as a con-
tract.297 The ex-wife, therefore, became entitled to the benefits of the plan
referred to in the agreed judgment, specifically, those benefits in effect at the
time of the decree. The court found it irrelevant that the federal military
authorities had otherwise interpreted the ex-wife's rights.298 The court
failed to discuss the possible impact of the changed federal law, but the ex-
wife was apparently entitled to coverage under the 1985 act most nearly
equivalent to the benefits that the parties agreed to in 1983.299 The benefits
agreed to in 1983 were, of course, non-existent. The apparent mutual mis-
take of the parties coupled with the later change in federal law in 1985 made
it possible for a court to give the agreement effect. 3° °
Roberts v. Poole30 dealt with the impact of the husband's bankruptcy on
the terms of a property-settlement-agreement incorporated in a divorce de-
cree. The agreement provided for the ex-wife's support at the rate of $3,000
a month for ten years and not as a part of a property division. Hence, the
ex-wife asserted that the support payments constituted alimony within sec-
tion 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code30 2 and were therefore not subject to
discharge. But the bankruptcy court found that the support payments actu-




300. Id. In Harris v. Harris, 765 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ), the
ex-wife alleged that a property settlement had been agreed to whereby she was entitled to the
proceeds of sale of certain real property. Although no agreement was proved, the ex-wife
could not have prevailed against a creditor holding a valid lien on the land, even if the property
settlement agreement had been valid. De Mello v. NBC Bank-Perrin Beitel, 762 S.W.2d 379
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
301. 80 Bankr. 81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
302. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982).
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ally constituted part of the property division, did not constitute alimony, and
were therefore dischargeable under section 523(a)(5)(B). 30 3 The ex-wife re-
lied principally on the parol evidence rule to exclude evidence which contra-
dicted the clear terms of the agreement. The Fifth Circuit in In re Benich 304
already rejected that argument.
The Texas Supreme Court has resolved the dispute in Herbert v. Her-
bert, 305 which the intermediate appellate court had analyzed as turning on
the terms of a property-settlement-agreement. 30 6 The supreme court classi-
fied the dispute as an evidentiary matter for the jury to decide as the finder of
fact.30 7 The ex-wife sued her former husband for one-half of his military
retirement benefits to which she alleged entitlement under a property-settle-
ment-agreement. The ex-husband contested the ex-wife's right on the
ground that she had materially breached the agreement when she refused to
deliver certain property to him in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment. After the parties tried this case to a jury, the trial judge rendered
judgment in favor of the ex-husband on the basis of the jury verdict that the
plaintiff-ex-wife failed to show her compliance with the terms of the agree-
ment. The Fort Worth court of appeals found the jury's answer inconsistent
with the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 30 8 Three justices
of the Texas Supreme Court held that it should reverse and remand the in-
termediate appellate court's judgment because the court of appeals had ap-
plied an incorrect test in reviewing the finding of the jury. 30 9 Three justices
concurred in the reversal but thought that the court should affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.3 10 One justice favored reversal and remand to the
trial court for a new trial, 3 1' and one other justice merely dissented and
apparently would have affirmed the holding of the court of appeals. 31 2 The
other two justices did not participate in the decision of the case.
When a spouse alleges that a property-settlement-agreement or an agreed
judgment was actuated by fraud or misrepresentation, the burden falls upon
the other spouse to show a lack of fault or negligence on his or her part. 31 3
The ex-spouse seeking to set aside a judgment based on such an agreement
must also show that the other party's fraud was extrinsic, that is, of a nature
denying an opportunity to litigate all rights or defenses the party was enti-
tled to assert.31 4 In Kennell v. Kennell 31 5 the ex-wife complained of extrin-
303. Id. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982).
304. 811 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1987).
305. 754 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1988).
306. 699 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985), rev'd, 754 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1988),
discussed in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw.
L.J. 1, 30-31 (1987) (discussion concerns an opinion later withdrawn and replaced).
307. 754 S.W.2d at 144.
308. 699 S.W.2d at 724.
309. 754 S.W.2d at 142 (opinion by Kilgarlin, J.); Id. at 145 (Phillips, C. J., concurring
joined by Gonzalez, J., concurring in the result).
310. Id. at 146-48 (Mauzy, J. joined by Ray, J.).
311. Id. at 145-46 (Culver, J.).
312. Id. at 148 (Robertson, J.).
313. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1001 (1950).
314. Id.
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sic fraud in an agreed judgment entered into as a result of her ex-husband's
misrepresentation of the value of community assets. In affirming the trial
court's rejection of her bill of review, the Houston court of appeals pointed
out that misrepresentation of value of a community asset falls short of con-
stituting extrinsic fraud.316 "Divorce litigants commonly assert differing
valuations and differing versions of the facts."' 317 The critical issue for the
court to determine is whether, by coercive or non-coercive action, the other
spouse precluded the complainant from determining the actual value of the
property. When the petitioner has all ordinary means of discovery available
or to establish values for herself, no grounds exist for her complaint.318
Making the Division. The division of property on divorce is the function of
the trial court. The appellate court participates in the process in only rare
instances. As a preliminary step toward division of the community, the
owners must identify their separate estates. In 1987 the legislature provided
that courts should use the clear and convincing standard of proof in order to
demonstrate that property is separate.319 In Bogart v. Somer,320 the Texas
Supreme Court approved this standard for an heir's rebuttal of donative in-
tent as the basis for a spousal transfer. 321 A couple bought realty and put
title in the name of their son-in-law without receiving value from him. The
court held that the son-in-law therefore presumptively received the property
as a gift rather than on a constructive trust for the purchasers, and clear and
convincing evidence is required to rebut such a presumption of gift. 32 2 In
this instance a strong presumption of gift exists and to demand a strict stan-
dard of evidence for rebuttal is not unreasonable. 323 But in the instance of a
presumed gift between spouses,3 24 when the presumption is weak,325 a mere
preponderance of the evidence seems sufficient for rebuttal.
Once separate property is identified and put aside, the entire community
315. 743 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
316. Id. at 301 (citing Rathmell v. Morrison, 732 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ)).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 301-302.
319. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon Supp. 1989).





324. See, Dewey v. Dewey, 745 S.W.2d 514, 518 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ
denied) (evidence held sufficient to rebut gift but presumption of gift and standard of evidence
to rebut it not discussed). See also Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 738, 741 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). Because the parties had not entered into a formal, infor-
mal, nor putative marriage at the time of the conveyance of the husband's separate half-inter-
est in realty (the condominium) to himself and his alleged informal wife. The alleged wife's
interest is her separate property acquired by gift. The man's donative intent was not contested;
however, the court could not presume a spousal gift since no marriage existed at the time of
the conveyance.




estate must be found 326 and valued. 327 When a community right of reim-
bursement is found the process is not over. As pointed out in Penick v.
Penick,328 the determination of such a community right is just the first step;
like other community property, the trial court may divide the community
right of reimbursement as it deems just and right. 329
Homestead property requires particular care. If the homestead is the sep-
arate property of one of the spouses, the court may grant occupancy to the
other spouse during conservatorship of their children, but no longer. 330
Although the court may order sale of a community homestead not capable
of partition between the spouses for the purpose of making a division of the
community estate,331 the Dallas court of appeals found the sale of a home-
stead inappropriate for the purpose of satisfying the claims of an unsecured
intervening creditor332 even if the homestead property is part of a larger
tract of non-exempt property. 333
An award of attorney's fees is an incident in the general division of the
community estate. 334 Thus, a claim for attorney's fees should not be severed
from the process of property-division. 335 In Eikenhorst v. Eikenhorst the
court added that a claimant of an attorney's fee should show that the fee is
necessary and reasonable. 336
The question sometimes arises whether a divorce court possesses the in-
herent power to grant a money judgment in favor of one spouse against the
other in order to divide the property justly when no liquid assets are avail-
able for division. In other contexts of partition courts have the analogous
power of granting and securing owelty, 337 and the use of this device by di-
326. The court denied discovery of the active files of a lawyer-husband for the purpose of
calculating the value of his interest in his firm's practice in Enos v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 946
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
327. See Snyder, Why Not Do It Yoursef? (Value the Pension in a Divorce Case), 9 FAIR-
SHARE 22 (No. I Jan. 1989) (raises many questions about the process of valuing a pension
interest but provides few answers). In Shafer v. Bedard, 761 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, no writ), a judicial admission barred discovery of financial records. In Euston v. Euston,
759 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ), which concerned the valuation of a
community partnership interest, the opinion is not clear on the evidentiary point.
328. 750 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
143, 146 (Dec. 14, 1988).
329. Id.
330. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex. 1977); LeBlanc v. LeBlanc,
761 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
331. Mallou v. Payne & Vendig, 750 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ
denied).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 255-257.
334. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950).
335. 750 S.W.2d at 257 (claim for attorney's fees by intervening creditor).
336. 746 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
337. Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 62, 161 S.W.2d 769, 772 (1942), Bouquet v. Belk, 404
S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Cf Smith v. Smith, 715
S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ) (lien for money judgment may be put on
property receiving a reimbursable benefit). In Murff v. Murft, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex.
1981), and Reaney v. Reaney, 5405 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ), the
money judgment awarded was in the nature of damages (or reimbursement) for secreted or
squandered funds.
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vorce-courts in lieu of selling the property and dividing the proceeds has
sometimes received appellate approval. 338 In the vast majority of cases, ap-
pellate courts uphold a trial court's exercise of discretion in the division of
community property. 339 Morris v. Morris340 is one of the rare instances in
which an appellate court found an abuse of discretion. The husband carried
on a very successful medical practice. The wife possessed few work-skills
and no other source of income. The trial court awarded the husband all of
the community's most valuable asset (an interest in a medical professional
association) as well as a medical partnership interest and a fully-furnished
home.34' The court awarded the wife with a furnished home, sixty percent
of the profit sharing plan of the professional association, some rural land,
and $5,000 in cash, after the payment of her debts.342 The court left the wife
with no income to maintain her home or to care for her child. Considering
the educational and experience benefits that had accrued to the husband dur-
ing the marriage and the marked disparity in earning power between the
spouses, 343 the court held that the property division was not "just and right"
under section 3.63 of the Family Code.
344
Within thirty days of rendition of the judgment, the Family Code 345 au-
thorizes the trial court to order temporary spousal support pending an ap-
peal and reasonable attorney's fees to pursue an appeal. 34 6 The award of
costs on appeal falls within the province of the appellate court.347 Because
the trial court and not the appellate court is responsible for the division of
property, if an error in division is committed, the appellate court must re-
mand the case to the trial court for redivision. 348 If the appellate court de-
termines, on appeal, that the trial court mischaracterized assets of any
significance, the court must remand for a new division. 349 The trial court's
improper application of the rules of reimbursement has the same effect.
3 50
Remand for redivision also seems appropriate when a mutual mistake of the
parties or a misapprehension by the trial judge causes a division of property
not actually owned by the community estate but by a third person. These
338. Dewey v. Dewey, 745 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ de-
nied); Weaks v. Weaks, 471 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ dism'd).
339. See Eikenhorst v. Eikenhorst, 746 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1988, no writ); Dewey, 745 S.W.2d at 520.
340. 757 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist. 1988, no writ).
341. Id. at 468.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
345. Id. § 3.58(h)(1),(2).
346. For applications of these provisions see In re Joiner, 755 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ) (support); Eikenhorst v. Eikenhorst, 746 S.W.2d 882, 891
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (attorney's fees); Ex parte Oliver, 736 S.W.2d
277, 279 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ) (support).
347. See In re Joiner, 755 S.W.2d at 500.
348. McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1976); LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 761
S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Rogers v. Rogers, 754 S.W.2d
236, 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
349. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985); In re Joiner, 755 S.W.2d at 498.
350. Rogers v. Rogers, 754 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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situations arose in two recent cases. In Seibert v. Seibert351 the divorce-
court purported to divide property belonging to third persons, a fact known
to one of the parties and their mutual attorney but not to the judge. On
appeal, the appellate court, therefore, found error in the division and re-
manded the case for a new division. 352 The situation in Crumley v.
Crumley353 was somewhat different. Both spouses believed that certain real
property was unencumbered and worth $45,000 whereas the property was
actually encumbered by a coal lease granted by a predecessor in title and was
worth $25,000. The court awarded the property to the wife on the basis of
the mistaken valuation354 and she later sued her ex-husband for damages
suffered when she subsequently sold the land. The ex-husband under the
same misapprehension as to the value of the land, discharged all of his obli-
gations under the divorce decree. Moreover, the ex-wife did not seek to set
aside the decree, and a court would not have done. Furthermore, the ex-wife
could not rectify the situation under provisions of the Family Code provid-
ing for a clarification of the decree355 or a division of undivided property. 356
But if the spouses had entered into a property-settlement-agreement or had
entered an agreed judgment based on a similar mutual mistake, the court
could reform the decree.357
Effect of Bankruptcy. Although the terms of a property division provided in
a settlement agreement are subject to discharge in bankruptcy, 358 a judg-
ment for necessaries supplied to a child survive discharge. In In re Boyd 359
the former husband recovered a judgment against his former wife for neces-
saries he supplied to their child. In her subsequent bankruptcy, he argued
that the Bankruptcy Code 36° protects his claim from discharge and the court
sustained his position.361 The same result should be reached with respect to
a debt for necessaries supplied to a spouse.
351. 759 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).
352. Id. at 770.
353. 753 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
354. Id. at 418.
355. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.72 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
356. Id.
357. See Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1986), discussed in McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 1, 29-30 (1987).
358. See Roberts v. Poole, 80 Bankr. 81 (N.D. Tex. 1987); see also supra note 301 and
accompanying text.
359. 93 Bankr. 538 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
360. 11 U.S.C. s 523(a)(5) (Supp. 11 1984).
361. 93 Bankr. at 539.
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